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 1 
Consequential Damages and Exclusion Clauses 
What’s in a name? Should it matter if a claim in a contract dispute were labeled 
consequential damages rather than direct damages? If the contract included a clause that 
would deny recovery for consequential damages the definition would indeed matter.1 I 
confess that I did not think the distinction was much of a problem until I ran into two 
practitioners in the same week who raised the issue. The first, a transactional lawyer, 
claimed he no longer knew what consequential damages meant, citing two opinions: 
Biotronik A.G. v. Conor Medsystems Ireland, Ltd.,2 and Pharmaceutical Product 
Development, Inc. v. TVM Life Science Ventures VI L.P.3 The second was the losing 
litigator in Biotronik.  
In Biotronik, the manufacturer of stents terminated an exclusive distribution 
contract. The distributor sued, claiming that it suffered substantial lost profits. The 
defendant asserted that the lost profits were consequential damages and invoked a clause 
in the contract excluding consequential damages. The plaintiff argued that the lost profits 
were direct damages, so the exclusion would not apply, and the New York Court of 
Appeals, in a 4-3 decision, agreed.4  
In the second case, the claim was that the seller of a company had breached a 
warranty about a drug’s efficacy and as a result the acquirer had incurred costs of 
millions of dollars in a fruitless attempt to develop the drug. The seller argued that the 
clause excluding consequential damages precluded recovery for these losses. Rejecting 
this argument, at the motion to dismiss stage, then Vice Chancellor Leo Strine noted that 
the “laundry list of precluded damages might have been put in the Merger Agreement by 
lawyers who themselves were unclear on what those terms actually mean.”5 He did not 
elaborate on how, if the transactional lawyers were unclear, the litigating lawyers would 
find clarity.6 
A search through the case law and commentary for the boundary between direct 
and consequential damages is unhelpful. A number of Courts have held that general 
damages are direct and special damages are consequential. A Westlaw search for 
[“consequential damages” and synonymous and “special damages”] yielded 35 cases,7 
                                                 
1 There is a second reason for concern about the distinction between consequential and direct damages. 
Some case law suggests that the standard of proof is higher for consequential damages. Two of those cases 
will be discussed below:  Tractebel Energy Marketing, Inc. v. AEP Power Marketing, Inc. 487 F.3d 89, 
(2007); and Compania Embotelladora Del Pacifico, S.A. v. Pepsi Cola Co., 650 F.Supp.2d 314 (2009). 
2 22 N.Y.3d 799 (2014). 
3 2011 Court Of Chancery Of Delaware WL 549163. 
4 The case will be discussed in Part I. B. 
5 At 7. 
6 The case will be discussed in Part III. 
7 Some examples: “Consequential,” “special” and “indirect” damages are synonymous terms, see Black's at 
445–46 (“[C]onsequential damages ... [are a]lso termed indirect damages.”); 3 Dobbs § 12.2(3), at 38 
(“[S]pecial damages is also referred to as consequential damages….”) In re CCT Commc'ns, Inc., 464 B.R. 
97, 117 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); The term “special damages” is synonymous with “consequential 
damages,” and both refer to damages that do not flow directly from the breach of the contract, but are still 
caused by the breach. In re Lyondell Chem. Co., 544 B.R. 75, 91 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016);The term 
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and a similar search for [“general damages” and synonymous and “direct damages”] 
yielded 40.8 The Restatement (Second) is unhelpful: “Loss that results from a breach in 
the ordinary course of events is foreseeable as the probable result of the breach. . . . Such 
loss is sometimes said to be the ‘natural’ result of the breach, in the sense that its 
occurrence accords with the common experience of ordinary persons . . . . The damages 
recoverable for such loss that results in the ordinary course of events are sometimes 
called ‘general’ damages.”9 It continues by blurring the categories: “The damages 
recoverable for loss that results other than in the ordinary course of events are sometimes 
called ‘special’ or ‘consequential’ damages. These terms are often misleading, however, 
and it is not necessary to distinguish between ‘general’ and ‘special’ or ‘consequential’ 
damages for the purpose of the rule stated in this Section.”10 But, obviously, it would be 
necessary if the question were whether the damages were recoverable given the existence 
of an exclusion clause. 
 
The Restatement invoked foreseeable, probable, and natural. Were the lost profits 
when a factory was shut down foreseeable? Did the damages flow naturally and 
necessarily from the breach? Was the loss a natural result in the ordinary course of 
events? These questions define a different boundary—the boundary between 
consequential damages that are recoverable and those that are not. It makes little sense to 
have them also define the boundary between direct and consequential damages. Yet some 
courts follow the Restatement. Judge Posner, for example, purported to distinguish 
between direct and consequential damages, “the difference lying in the degree to which 
the damages are a foreseeable (that is, a highly probable) consequence of a breach.”11 
 Instead of invoking concepts like foreseeability and naturalness, I propose that we 
view the contract as an asset and that direct damages be defined as the change in the 
value of that asset.12 Consider a simple example. Suppose that the seller promises to 
deliver 1,000 bushels of wheat at $3; at the time of delivery the price is $4 and the seller 
breaches. Everyone, I believe, will agree that the damages would be $1,000 and would be 
                                                                                                                                                 
“consequential damages” is synonymous with special damages. Progress Energy, Inc. v. U.S. Glob., LLC, 
102 So. 3d 768, 771 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
8 Some examples: “ General damages are synonymous with ‘direct’ damages, see Black's Law Dictionary 
446 (9th ed. 2009) (‘Black’s’) (noting that ‘general damages’ are also termed ‘direct damages’), and 
provide the aggrieved party with the difference between the price he agreed to pay and the value he was to 
receive through performance. 15 3 Dobbs § 12.2(1), at 21.” In re CCT Commc'ns, Inc., 464 B.R. 97, 116 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); “The damages contemplated by UCC § 2–714 are referred to as direct or general 
damages. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 418 F.Supp. at 454; General damages are synonymous with “direct” 
damages. KSW Mech. Servs. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 135, 145 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); General 
damages are synonymous with ‘direct’ damages, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 544 B.R. 62, 72 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
9 Restatement 351, Comment b. (emphasis added) 
10 Id. 
11 Rexnord, p1004. The outcome of the case did not depend on this demarcation.  
12 See my Reckoning Contract Damages: Valuation Of The Contract As An Asset, Wash & Lee. 
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direct. The change in the value of the asset in this simple case is the contract/market 
differential. For more complex transactions ascertaining the change in the contract value 
would be difficult, but that is only a measurement problem. Those complex transactions 
will be the focus of the remainder of the paper. 
One component of damages—lost profits—has been particularly controversial. 
Disclaimers typically include lost profits as a component of consequential damages.13 If 
the damages could be classified as direct damages, the disclaimer would fail to protect 
the seller. Some courts have concluded that all lost profits claims are for consequential 
damages. “Although [plaintiff] suggests that the issue of whether lost profits may be 
considered direct damages has yet to be decided by an Iowa court, the Court finds that a 
fair reading of Iowa law reveals that lost profits are routinely regarded as consequential 
damages and not as direct damages.”14 That, however, is a minority view. There remains, 
however, substantial disagreement as to how to characterize claims for lost profits. One 
proffered distinction is to treat claims for “collateral business” as consequential. In 
Tractebel Energy Marketing, Inc. v. AEP Power Marketing, Inc.,15 the New York Court 
of Appeals said: 
Lost profits are consequential damages when, as a result of the breach, the 
non-breaching party suffers loss of profits on collateral business 
arrangements. In the typical case, the ability of the non-breaching party to 
operate his business, and thereby generate profits on collateral 
transactions, is contingent on the performance of the primary contract. 
When the breaching party does not perform, the non-breaching party’s 
business is in some way hindered, and the profits from potential collateral 
exchanges are “lost.”  
   *   *   * 
By contrast, when the non-breaching party seeks only to recover money 
that the breaching party agreed to pay under the contract, the damages 
sought are general damages. . . . The damages may still be characterized as 
lost profits since, had the contract been performed, the non-breaching 
party would have profited to the extent that his cost of performance was 
less than the total value of the breaching party’s promised payments. But, 
in this case, the lost profits are the direct and probable consequence of the 
breach. The profits are precisely what the non-breaching party bargained 
for, and only an award of damages equal to lost profits will put the non-
breaching party in the same position he would have occupied had the 
contract been performed.16  
Courts have, in a number of instances, used the “collateral business” language to 
                                                 
13 Here is a fairly typical disclaimer: “Under no circumstances whatsoever will either party be liable under 
any theory of liability for special, incidental or consequential damages including, without limitation, lost 
profits or revenues, even if such party has been advised of the possibility or likelihood of such damages.” 
(Optimal Interiors, LLC v. HON Co., 774 F.Supp.2d 993, 1008 (2011)).  (emphasis added) 
14 Optimal Interiors, p. 1012. 
15 487 F.3d 89, (2007). The case will be discussed below in Section I.A. 
16 487 F.3d 89, 109-110 (2007). (emphasis added) 
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conclude that a claim was for consequential damages,17 but it is over-inclusive. Suppose, 
for example, that a licensee were to breach a patent license. If the license called for 
annual payments, the damages would be direct—the present value of the future stream of 
payments offset by any mitigation. No one questions that. What if the payments were a 
royalty based on sales? If the licensee were to breach, the future stream of payments 
would be the royalty on the future sales—losses on collateral business. Would the change 
in the form of compensation convert the damages from direct to consequential? That 
issue will be significant when we consider below claims by terminated distributors, like 
Biotronik.    
Even if a court were to find the claimant entitled to direct damages, reckoning 
those damages would be problematic. The lost profits remedy can, if not tightly cabined, 
result in substantial overcompensation. That adds an additional layer of complexity to the 
analysis. I have argued in recent papers against allowing recovery for two classes of 
claims. One involves the plaintiff who claims that if the defendant had not breached, it 
would have had an additional sale, the so-called lost volume seller.18 The other involves 
the new business rule, in particular claims of the sort “if you had performed, my project 
would have been a success and I would have made a lot of money.”19 So, while I will 
argue that in some of the cases analyzed below that the court should have found the 
damages direct, I will not necessarily endorse how courts had reckoned those damages. 
 The direct versus consequential damages question arises in a number of different 
contexts. Suppose that a seller were to wrongfully terminate a contract. In the simplest 
case, the market price had risen and the seller breached. The buyer’s claim would be for 
the difference between the contract price and the market price. Labeling this measure lost 
profits would seem to be a pretty strained terminology. Indeed, Mr. Justice Cooke 
rejected such language: “The contract price/market price differential is not a computation 
of lost profit . . . . In my judgment, no-one who understood the way in which the Sale of 
Goods Act works, would refer to this measure of loss as ‘lost profits’ or ‘loss of 
anticipated profits’ and clause 32.1 cannot operate to exclude the loss claimed here.”20 
Nonetheless, courts frequently do characterize such claims as lost profits. We shall see, in 
Section I.A, in cases involving the repudiation of a long-term contract, the lost profits 
language is routinely used. In these cases, lost profits would clearly be direct damages. A 
blanket disclaimer of lost profits would risk excluding claims for the contract/market 
differential.  
                                                 
17 See, for example, Compania Embotelladora Del Pacifico, S.A. v. Pepsi Cola Co., 650 F.Supp.2d 314 
(2009). (discussed below in Section I.B) 
18 Victor P. Goldberg, The Lost Volume Seller, R.I.P., 2 The Criterion Journal on Innovation, 205-231. 
19 Victor P. Goldberg, The New Business Rule and Compensation for Lost Profits, 1 The Criterion Journal 
on Innovation, 341-372 
20 Glencore Energy UK Ltd v Cirrus Oil Services Ltd, 2014 WL 16577 (2014), ¶¶98-100. An American 
court made a similar argument: “Nor is defendant correct in describing as lost profits the gain that Western 
Union could have expected to realize from the sale of the launch contract. That gain—the difference 
between the contract price and the market price (or more specifically, the price Hughes Communications 
would have been willing to pay)—is synonymous with the very value of the performance for which 
Western Union had bargained. Such a value, by definition, constitutes general damages rather than lost 
profits.” New Valley Corp. v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 411, 414 (2006). 
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Suppose that instead of the contract having an explicit price, the complainant’s 
compensation were indirect. It might, for example, be a wrongfully terminated 
distributor, like Biotronik. There would have been no explicit promise to pay the 
distributor any amount. Whether its loss should be treated as direct is a harder question, 
and the courts have gone both ways. I will argue that the damages in this case as well 
should be classified as direct. The trick will be recognizing that the distributor is selling a 
service to the manufacturer and the price is determined by the difference between the 
wholesale and retail price. These cases will be considered in Section I.B. 
 Wrongful termination is but one way of breaching a contract. Delay presents 
different issues. Delay might give rise to a claim for lost profits while a factory is closed 
(Hadley v Baxendale). Or the claimant might argue that it had incurred additional costs 
because of the seller’s delay, perhaps in an attempt to mitigate losses.21 Whether these 
consequential damages would be recoverable in the absence of a disclaimer would be 
contestable. Might any delay damages be direct? In Section II I will consider two cases. 
In the first the court incorrectly labeled some of the damages as direct; in the second it 
correctly labeled them correct, but for the wrong reason.  
The breach of warranty cases are, I believe, the most complicated ones. If, for 
example, a manufacturer warrants that a machine will perform at a level of 100, but it 
only performs at 80, would the buyer’s additional expenses be classified as consequential 
damages or direct? What about the additional research expenditures alluded to in 
Pharmaceutical Product? The warranty cases will be analyzed in Section III. 
Rather than producing a compilation of cases, my approach has been to focus on a 
few cases in each category. There is a tradeoff between depth and breadth; whether I have 
struck the proper balance I leave to the reader’s judgment. I do not claim that my 
categories capture the entire range of issues. There are, no doubt, other contexts in which 
the direct versus consequential damage question arises but I believe that I have captured 
the most significant categories.  
I. Termination and Lost Profits 
A. Change in Market Conditions 
 
Contracts assign the risks of market change. If the market price goes up and the 
seller breaches, the buyer’s damages are the difference between the contract and market 
price. In a simple commodity sale, these “lost profits” are clearly direct damages. They 
give the claimant the benefit of the bargain. 
 
Cherokee Cty. Cogeneration Partners, L.P. v. Dynegy Mktg. & Trade22 adds one 
wrinkle to the contract-market differential story. The contract called for Dynegy to sell a 
fixed quantity of natural gas each day to Cherokee. The contract gave Cherokee the 
option of using the gas for its own cogeneration facility or to resell the gas to third 
parties. The contract included a clause that would award Cherokee the contract-market 
                                                 
21 See, for example, Spang Industries, Inc. Ft. Pitt Div. v. Aetna, 512 F.2d 365 (1975). 
22 305 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. App. 2009). 
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differential for any shortfall (the standard remedy for direct damages),23 and a no 
consequential damages clause.24 After Hurricane Katrina, Dynegy attempted to invoke 
the force majeure clause for a five-week period. During that time, the market price of 
natural gas jumped to about five to ten times the contract price. Dynegy managed to 
provide sufficient gas to operate Cherokee’s facility, but fell short of delivering the 
contract quantity. Cherokee contested Dynegy’s force majeure claim and sued claiming 
that Dynegy had breached, asking for the shortfall multiplied by the difference between 
the contract and market price—almost $5 million.25  
 
Dynegy moved for partial summary judgment contending that the damages were 
consequential lost-profits damages. If Dynegy had failed to provide enough gas to run 
Cherokee’s facility, then, it conceded, it would have been liable for direct damages. 
However, Cherokee was asking for “[p]rofits lost due to the loss of other contracts, and 
similar collateral opportunities, [which] are the classic ‘consequential’ damages.”26 Since 
the contract excluded recovery of consequential damages, Cherokee should get nothing. 
The trial court agreed. 
 
The Court of Appeals reversed. Because Cherokee was free to resell to anyone, the 
court concluded, it was free “to profit from increases in the market-price of natural gas, 
by purchasing the commodity from Dynegy at the contract price and then reselling the 
purchased gas at a higher price.”27 Thus, “Dynegy’s alleged breach would naturally and 
necessarily cause Cherokee to suffer direct damages in the form of profits on the 
Agreement itself.”28 Two points are worth noting. First, the defendant tried 
(unsuccessfully) to invoke the collateral business defense; second, the contract-market 
differential was characterized by the Court as Cherokee’s lost profits. The contract 
assigned the market risk; it was for the delivery of a specific quantity at a fixed price. 
Whether Cherokee intended to use the gas for its own facility or to sell it to others should 
have been irrelevant, as the Court of Appeals held. 
 
Cherokee was pretty easy; the lost profits were simply the contract-market 
differential for goods not delivered. The anticipatory repudiation of a long-term contract 
is more complicated, but the principles are the same. The contract should be viewed as an 
asset and the damages would be the decline in the value of the asset at the time of the 
                                                 
23 “Seller’s Failure to Make Gas Available. If Seller fails, in whole or in part, to make available to Buyer 
the then-effective Nominated Purchase Quantity on any day, and if such failure is not excused by an event 
of force majeure or Buyer’s failure to take gas nominated, Buyer’s right to recover damages for such failure 
shall be limited to an amount equal to the shortfall in delivery from the Nominated Purchase Quantity, 
multiplied by the amount, if any, by which the Gas Daily Spot Price (hereinafter defined) exceeds the 
applicable Commodity Charge.” (At 312-313) 
24 “Neither party shall be liable in any event for consequential, incidental, special or punitive damages or 
losses which may be suffered by the other as a result of the failure to deliver . . . the required quantities of 
gas.” (At 313) 
25 Dynegy brief, p. 6. This was only a partial breach—the contract remained in force after the alleged force 
majeure period. 
26 Dynegy brief, p. 8. 
27 At 315. 
28 At 315 (emphasis in the original). 
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repudiation.29 In Tractebel, after the market price for electricity collapsed, the buyer 
repudiated a 20-year agreement for the purchase of electric power from American 
Electric Power (AEP).30 As in many long-term contracts, both price and quantity were 
variable. The court concluded that Tractebel (TEMI) had repudiated and was then 
confronted with the issue of damages.  
The contract included a termination clause. If TEMI defaulted, AEP may 
“accelerate all amounts owing between the Parties and . . . liquidate and terminate all 
obligations under this Agreement;”31 the termination payment would be the difference 
between the payments TEMI was required to make and the market value of the products 
it was supposed to purchase.32 Even if the contract were silent on the matter, this would 
be how damages would be defined. Damages would be the present value at the time of 
the repudiation of the difference between the value of the contract before and after the 
market decline—characterized by the court and the economic experts as lost profits. The 
trial judge asked whether the lost profits were general (direct) damages or special 
(consequential) damages. He concluded the latter: 
General damages are usually measured by the difference between the 
market value for a product and the contract price. On the other hand, 
“special” or “consequential” damages “seek to compensate a plaintiff for 
additional losses (other than the value of the promised performance) that 
are incurred as a result of the defendant’s breach. The type of 
consequential damages most often sought is lost operating profits of a 
business.” . . . In this case, the amount of damages sought by AEP 
resembles most closely consequential damages. . . . AEP’s claim is 
appropriately characterized as one for consequential damages because it is 
a measure of “income or loss, or cash flow, including losses that may 
result far into the future.”33  
 The Court of Appeals disagreed. “In characterizing AEP’s claim as one for 
consequential damages, the district court confused the benefit of the bargain with 
speculative profits on collateral transactions . . . . AEP seeks only what it bargained for—
the amount it would have profited on the payments TEMI promised to make for the 
remaining years of the contract. This is most certainly a claim for general damages.”34 
The value of the contract to the seller had increased because of the market collapse, just 
as the value of the Cherokee contract to the buyer had increased when the price of gas 
soared. Measurement was much easier in Cherokee, but in each case the damage claim 
was for direct damages. 
 Why did it matter? The concern was not whether a damage claim was excluded. 
                                                 
29 See Victor P. Goldberg, Reckoning Contract Damages: Valuation Of The Contract As An Asset 
Washington & Lee L. Rev. (forthcoming) 
30 For additional detail on the contract, see Contract as an Asset. 
31 Tractebel Energy Marketing, Inc. v. AEP Power Marketing, Inc. 2006 WL 147586, p. 1. 
32 At p. 2 
33 At p. 2. Internal quotations are to AEP’s claim is appropriately characterized as one for consequential 
damages because it is a measure of “income or loss, or cash flow, including losses that may result far into 
the future.” 
34 Tractebel Energy Marketing, Inc. v. AEP Power Marketing, Inc., 487 F.3d 89, 110 (2007). 
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Rather, the issue was the standard of proof:   
 While certainty of amount is not an element of general damages in New 
York, it is an element of consequential damages. In addition to proving 
that the existence of damage is reasonably certain, and that the damages 
were foreseeable and within the contemplation of both parties, a party 
claiming consequential damages must also prove the amount of damage 
with “reasonable certainty.” . . . Thus, there exists a higher burden for 
proving consequential damages than for general damages. This is the 
burden that the district court erroneously imposed on AEP.35 
Had the Court of Appeals concluded that the lost profits should be labeled consequential 
damages, it would presumably have refused to award expectation damages. The trial 
judge was dissatisfied with the economic expert reports and held that even with the lower 
standard of proof for direct losses, their estimates were too speculative. “With so many 
unknown variables, these experts might have done as well had they consulted tea leaves 
or a crystal ball.”36  (The experts differed by around $500 million.) As a result, he would 
have awarded no damages. Again, the Court of Appeals disagreed. If proof were 
disallowed because of all the unknown variables, it said, no victims of a repudiation of a 
long-term contract could ever be compensated.  
When a buyer repudiates a contract the seller can mitigate damages in one of two 
ways. It could continue to produce with damages being the expected difference in 
revenues in the pre- and post-repudiation worlds—that is how the Court of Appeals 
would have damages reckoned in Tractebel. But what if the expected future unit costs of 
production exceeded the expected prices? Then mitigation would entail shutting the 
project down. The seller’s loss would be the expected future revenues less the expected 
cost of producing that revenue (the costs saved). Courts have recognized this measure, 
treating it as obvious that the remedy would be labeled lost profits. For example, in a 
casebook favorite, Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co.,37 
Judge Posner noted: “With the collapse of oil prices, which has depressed the price of 
substitute fuels as well, this coal costs far more to get out of the ground than it is worth in 
the market.”38 He concluded: “The loss to Carbon County from the breach of contract is 
simply the difference between (1) the contract price (as escalated over the life of the 
contract in accordance with the contract’s escalator provisions) times quantity, and (2) 
the cost of mining the coal over the life of the contract.”39 That difference, he says, is the 
seller’s lost profits.40 
In New Valley Corp. v. U.S.41 the court did a good job distinguishing the direct 
damages from the consequential damages. Western Union (renamed New Valley in 1991) 
had a contract with NASA to receive launch services for a communications satellite. 
                                                 
35 At 111. 
36 5 WL 1863853 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2005) at p. 11-12.  
37 799 F.2d 265 (1986) 
38 At 279. 
39 At 279. 
40 “Hence by offering Carbon County more than contract damages (i.e., more than Carbon County’s lost 
profits). . . “ At 279. 
41 72 Fed. Cl. 411 (2006). 
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After the Challenger disaster, President Reagan announced that “NASA will no longer be 
in the business of launching private satellites.”42 The court held that this violated NASA’s 
best efforts obligation and therefore NASA had repudiated. Western Union had gone into 
bankruptcy and its communications satellite business had been sold to Hughes 
Communications. At trial the government argued that there should be no damages since 
Western Union’s precarious financial condition meant that it would not have been able to 
perform. The court rejected that argument holding that its financial capacity was 
irrelevant since it could have assigned the launch contract, thereby allowing Western 
Union to realize the market value of the contract. The court left for future determination 
the question of “how much more Hughes Communication would have paid for the Westar 
Division assets had they included a NASA launch contract.”43 That is, the launch contract 
was an asset and, as in Tractebel, the damages would be the change in the value of that 
asset.  
In the next phase, both parties asked for summary judgment. NASA claimed that 
all the damages were consequential damages and recovery was precluded by the 
disclaimer: “liability to the Customer . . . shall be limited to direct damages only and shall 
not include any loss of revenue, profits or other indirect or consequential damages.”44 
Why might they be consequential? The government’s reasoning strikes me as incoherent: 
 In support of this argument, defendant asserts that Western Union did not 
sell the Westar Division assets because of the breach but rather because it 
was confronting a liquidity crisis that left it without sufficient funds to 
satisfy its day-to-day operations and also meet its debt service obligations. 
Defendant thus maintains that plaintiff’s damages cannot be said to flow 
directly from the breach but are instead the result of a collateral 
undertaking and therefore constitute consequential damages. More 
particularly, defendant identifies plaintiff’s damages claim as a claim for 
lost profits, i.e., monies that Western Union claims it would have realized 
had it been able to sell its favorably priced NASA launch contract for its 
much higher market value.45 
The government appears to be arguing that the change in value of the launch contract 
could be characterized as lost profits (true), and since the disclaimer mentions lost profits 
(true), lost profits cannot be recovered (not true). The court rightly rejected the motion. 
The sale was not caused by the breach. Rather, “the sale was simply the focal point of the 
loss, i.e., the occasion when the market value of the launch contract could have been 
realized by Western Union had there in fact been no breach.”46 Damages would have 
been the difference between what Hughes would have paid had it purchased the Western 
assets with and without the launch contract.  
There were complementary assets that also diminished in value as a result of the 
                                                 
42  New Valley Corp. v. U.S., 119 F.3d 1576, 1578 (1997). (citing 22 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1103, 1104 
(Aug. 15, 1986)).  
43 At 413. 
44 At 413. 
45 At 413-414. 
46 At 414. 
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repudiation--notably a satellite, which accounted for about half of the $40 million Hughes 
paid for Western’s assets. The plaintiff asked for $11.7 million for the diminution in 
value of the satellite. The court properly rejected that claim since the satellite’s lost value, 
and that of other assets, were simply a consequence of the breach. The court did, in 
passing, raise one troublesome point. In determining the damages it suggested that 
Western Union’s financial situation should be taken into account referring to “the sale 
price Western Union reasonably might have expected to receive given its distressed 
financial position and Hughes Communications’ awareness of that condition.”47 Damages 
arising from the unique characteristics of the claimant (Western’s financial position, 
Hadley’s shaft inventory) would be consequential. In the instant case, there should be no 
impact since Western’s financial position would likely have had the same effect on the 
sale price with and without the launch contract.   
In the previous cases the breach was precipitated by changed market conditions.  
In Penncro Associates, Inc. v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P.48 there was no indication of a change 
in the market. Nonetheless, the court concluded correctly that the claimant’s lost profits 
were direct, not consequential. Sprint, having decided to outsource the collection of 
overdue payments, entered into contracts with three providers, one of the contracts being 
a three-year agreement with Penncro. The agreement required that Penncro maintain a 
staffing level sufficient to provide Sprint with 80,625 productive hours per month and 
Sprint agreed to pay for 80,625 productive hours per month.49 The court interpreted this 
as a contract for capacity—it would have to pay “whether or not Penncro’s phones were 
ringing.”50  It did not go well. After a few months in which usage fell short of 80,625 
hours, Sprint invoked the termination clause, which allowed it to terminate after six 
consecutive months of poor performance. Specifically, if Penncro ranked last of the three 
providers in certain performance metrics, Sprint could terminate. However, the court 
concluded, Penncro did not rank last and therefore the termination was wrongful. Sprint 
did not contest liability; it only contested damages.51 
 Penncro did not claim damages for the period prior to the termination, but it did 
sue for the “lost profits” for the remainder of the contract period. The trial court awarded 
Penncro $53,109,386 in lost contractual revenues, minus $28,307,302 in costs avoided by 
not having to perform and $7,665,472 in losses avoided due to the breach for a final total 
of $17,136,612.  Both parties appealed. Sprint argued that recovery for lost profits was 
barred by the contractual disclaimer of liability for consequential damages, “includ[ing], 
but ... not limited to, lost profits, lost revenues and lost business opportunities.”52 Penncro 
                                                 
47 At 414. 
48 499 F.3d 1151 (2007). 
49 A productive hour was defined as time spent by a fully trained Penncro employee handling calls, waiting 
for calls, training, or waiting due to system downtime. Cite. The contract set the hourly rate at $22; in 
addition, the contract required that Penncro assign, and Sprint pay for, 40 managers per month at $4,500 
per manager. 
50 At 1159. 
51 “But Sprint long ago made the tactical decision not to contest liability on this or any other basis—such as 
mutual breach, anticipatory breach, mistake, fraud, or material misrepresentation—and its decision to hang 
its hat at trial solely on the nature and quantum of Penncro’s damages cannot be reconsidered on appeal.” 
At 1159. 
52 At 1155. 
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disputed the reduction for losses avoided. In an opinion written by then Circuit Judge 
Neil Gorsuch, the trial court decision was affirmed on all counts.  
The damages, he held, were direct damages, not consequential. This was, in 
effect, a take-or-pay contract. In an anticipatory repudiation of a capacity contract, the 
damages reflect the claimant’s mitigation.53 Sprint had promised to pay for 80,625 hours 
per month for the duration of the contract. Its breach released Penncro from its obligation 
to incur the costs of maintaining that staffing level (the costs avoided) and it was now 
free to use those resources for other purposes (the losses avoided).54  
Penncro claimed that it would have been able to fulfill the other contracts it had 
subsequently entered into, even if this one had remained in effect. It was, it claimed, a 
lost volume seller, so the profits it made on these other contracts should not be used to 
partially offset the assessed damages.55 The trial court found that Penncro did enter into 
two contracts afterwards, but concluded that it could not have performed these while 
performing this contract. It therefore rejected the lost volume argument and deducted 
those earnings (the loss avoided) from the assessed damages.    
B. Indirect Compensation 
Compania Embotelladora Del Pacifico, S.A. v. Pepsi Cola Co.,56 did not involve a 
termination, but it is an indirect-compensation case that is cited in a number of the 
termination cases. In Compania, Judge Rakoff denied recovery on a number of grounds, 
one of which was the higher standard of proof for a consequential damage claim. 
Compania (CEPSA) would “bottle sell and distribute the [Pepsi–Cola] beverage only in 
the [appointed territory],” and it would “not, directly or indirectly, bottle, sell or 
distribute the Beverage in any other Territory.”57  It had been a Pepsi bottler for over 40 
years.  Since the agreement had no definite term it was terminable at will by either party. 
CEPSA claimed that Pepsi had breached the exclusivity agreement by failing to police 
“transshipping,” i.e., the sale by third parties (other Pepsi bottlers) into CEPSA’s 
exclusive territory. 
Judge Rakoff ruled against the bottler on a number of grounds. First, he held that 
there was no breach. The contract granted CEPSA an exclusive territory, but Pepsi did 
not promise to police transshipping. It had no obligation to take affirmative steps to 
prevent other bottlers from selling in the exclusive territory. That should have been 
enough—no breach, no damages.  
However, Judge Rakoff piled on with additional grounds for rejection. He granted 
Pepsi’s summary judgment motion on the admissibility of the CEPSA experts’ damage 
report.58 CEPSA’s expert witnesses estimated lost profits by projecting the dollar sales 
that CEPSA would have made but for the transshipment, and then applying CEPSA’s 
historical profit margin rate. The damages, claimed the experts, were over $236 million.  
                                                 
53 See Contract as an Asset.  
54 This is a mix of Tractebel (losses avoided) and NIPSCO (costs avoided). 
55 For a more complete analysis of why there should be no recovery for the lost volume seller, see my The 
Lost Volume Seller, R.I.P., 2 The Criterion Journal on Innovation, 205-231. 
56 650 F.Supp.2d 314 (2009). 
57 At 318. 
58 This is the longest part of the opinion. At 318-321. 
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“An even cursory review of these damages calculations demonstrates that they are based 
on what [the expert] himself concedes to be unreliable and inaccurate data, together with 
a series of assumptions that have no basis in fact or reality.”59 (The reports appear to have 
some problems, but I confess that I have seen courts accept a lot worse.) 
Citing Tractebel, he asked whether “the damages sought by CEPSA are general, 
thus merely requiring a ‘reasonable estimate’ of damages before an award can be made, 
or instead consequential, thus requiring CEPSA to prove such damages “with reasonable 
certainty.”60 He answered: consequential. “Here, CEPSA is plainly not seeking to recover 
money that PepsiCo agreed to pay under the EBA. Instead, CEPSA is seeking to recover 
lost profits from lost sales to third-parties that are not governed by the [contract]. Such 
damages are properly characterized as consequential damages, because, as a result of 
PepsiCo’s alleged breach, CEPSA suffered lost profits on collateral business 
arrangements (i.e., sales of PepsiCo products to its customers throughout its exclusive 
territory).”61 CEPSA fell short of the “reasonable certainty” standard. “In the absence of 
any admissible expert testimony concerning causation or damages, and without any 
evidence indicating that CEPSA would have made any additional sales in the absence of 
transshipment, CEPSA plainly falls short of this standard, and summary judgment 
dismissing its breach of contract claim is thus warranted.”62 The experts’ damage reports 
were inadmissible regardless of what standard they were held to, so it should not have 
mattered whether the damages were classified as consequential or direct. CEPSA should 
lose because Pepsi hadn’t breached and, anyway, CEPSA could not prove any damages. 
So, it really wasn't necessary for him to determine whether the claimed damages 
were direct or consequential. But what if he had found that Pepsi had promised not to 
police transshipping and failed to do so? CEPSA’s claim was for sales that would have 
been made, but for the breach. Judge Rakoff characterized these as lost profits for sales to 
third parties invoking the collateral business standard, discussed above;63 therefore, he 
concluded, the damages were consequential. His argument appears to be that even if 
every sale by a transshipper would have been made instead by CEPSA, its hypothesized 
sales would be to third parties, and the lost profits would therefore be consequential 
damages.  
Judge Rakoff might not have been willing to go quite that far. Perhaps his concern 
was that there was not a one-to-one relationship between the sales made by others (the 
transshipping bottlers) and the sales that would have been made by CEPSA.  The lost 
profits were too uncertain and therefore, he presumably thought, they did not flow 
directly from the breach. However, that would just present a measurement problem (one a 
lot easier than the one in Tractebel). CEPSA’s losses would be of the same type as Otis 
Wood’s losses when Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon breached her agreement and entered into 
endorsement agreements directly with Sears and others.64 That is, the contract gave 
                                                 
59 At 319.  
60 At 322. 
61 At 322. 
62 At 322. (emphasis added) 
63 At 322.  
64 Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917); for more detail on the case, see Goldberg, 
Framing Contract Law, ch. 2. 
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CEPSA (and Wood) all the revenue it could generate in its exclusive arrangement, but the 
breach resulted directly in a reduction of those revenues (subject to mitigation); the 
damages were direct.  
I want to turn to a different type of case involving a distributor. What if a 
manufacturer wrongly terminated a distributor who then claims that it had lost future 
profits? Biotronik, which will be discussed below, is one such case. Consider first a 
stylized example. A manufacturer, M1, buys retailing services from a retailer, R1. M1 
agrees to pay to R1 a flat rate of $10,000 per month for retailing services for ten years. 
After two years M1 is dissatisfied and breaches the agreement. There should be no doubt 
that the damages would be direct. Damages would be for lost profits, calculated in the 
same way as Tractebel’s and Carbon County’s were—the future revenue stream ($10,000 
per month), taking into account reasonable mitigation.  
Of course, distribution contracts usually are not flat rate. In most instances, that 
would be inefficient. Instead, when manufacturers buy retailing services, they typically 
pay for them indirectly—the difference between the wholesale and retail price—so there 
would be no explicit price term.65 Suppose that M2 were to wrongfully terminate such a 
contract with R2. While the contract would be written in terms of the sale of goods from 
M2 to R2, functionally it is the sale of retailing services from R2 to M2. If M2 were to 
breach, R2’s damages would be its future lost profits. There would be no reason to 
distinguish between the claims of R1 and R2 since both would be for a future stream of 
payments, a direct result of the termination. The fact that R2’s claim was based on 
“collateral business” ought to be irrelevant.  
Returning to CEPSA, suppose that Pepsico had breached, that the contract was for 
a fixed time period, and the damage claim was for future lost profits. (The court had 
found that the actual contract was terminable at will in which case there would have been 
no future lost profits.) CEPSA’s claim would be the same as R2’s. But for the breach it 
would have made future sales and incurred future costs. Perhaps, it would have mitigated 
by using its facilities for some other purpose.66 Measurement would have been difficult, 
but that does not change the conclusion that those losses would have been direct, not 
consequential.  
In CEPSA there was no disclaimer of consequential damages. Judge Rakoff’s 
concern was the higher standard of proof for consequential damages. In some other cases 
in which a distributor sued for lost profits, there was a disclaimer and the courts labeled 
the damages consequential, thereby denying recovery. Two examples: “Because those 
damages rely on future deals with a business that is not a party to the [contract], and are 
contingent on anticipated prices and demand that are not determined by the contract 
itself, the damages are not ‘necessarily inherent in the contract.”67 “Because the 
remainder of the profit Optimal alleges it would have earned under the Agreement 
was entirely contingent on collateral third-party agreements, the Court must find 
                                                 
65 In some instances, for example cosmetics departments, a manufacturer will rent space in a department 
store, essentially paying a fixed monthly fee.  
66 In fact, CEPSA was in bankruptcy, but that should not matter. 
67 Atlantech Inc. v. American Panel Corp., 743 F.3d 287, 294. (2014). 
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that the remainder of Optimal’s claim is a claim for consequential damages.”68 Not 
all courts reasoned this way. “Unquestionably the Distributorship Agreement 
contemplated DP’s selling of AM’s machines for a profit. Alleged damages in the form 
of loss of profits and the disruption of day to day business, for example, could be viewed 
as flowing directly and immediately from the breach of the claimed contract.”69 
The facts in Biotronik are a bit more complicated than the simple manufacturer-
retailer example. Conor was the developer and manufacturer of CoStar, a drug-eluting 
coronary stent.70 The agreement gave Biotronik the exclusive right to distribute CoStar in 
a worldwide market territory excluding the United States and certain other countries. 
Biotronik promised to use commercially reasonable efforts to promote and distribute 
CoStar. Biotronik began distributing the product in 2006 after receiving regulatory 
approval. In the next year two things happened that led to Conor recalling all the stents 
and stopping production. In an FDA trial it could not establish that CoStar was equivalent 
to Taxus, a stent produced by a competitor. In addition, Conor was purchased by Johnson 
& Johnson which marketed a competing stent, Cypher. Conor then recalled CoStar and 
notified Biotronik that it was removing it from the market. Biotronik sued claiming that 
the recall was a sham motivated by J&J’s interest in promoting its competing product. It 
asked for its lost profits (which its expert said were $85 million). The contract included a 
disclaimer of consequential damages: “Neither party shall be liable to the other for any 
indirect, special, consequential, incidental or punitive damage with respect to any claim 
arising out of this agreement (including without limitation its performance or breach of 
this agreement) for any reason.”71 
 Conor moved for summary judgment on liability and damages. Summary 
judgment on liability was denied. The trial court granted its motion on damages, holding 
that the lost profits were consequential and therefore precluded. A unanimous Appellate 
Court (6-0) agreed; however, in a 4-3 decision, the Court of Appeals reversed holding 
that the damages were direct and therefore the claim was not barred by the disclaimer.72 
So, although the final decision held that the damages were direct, ten of the fourteen 
judges ruling on the case held otherwise. The case subsequently settled for an undisclosed 
amount (but, I am told, for substantially less than $85 million). 
 The contract mechanics were somewhat complicated. Quantity was to be 
determined by a process. Biotronik would make a forecast of the upcoming 12-month 
period, updating it monthly. The contract established a mechanism for determining a 
minimum order for each month. Biotronik was obligated to take, and pay for, the 
minimum quantity. Conor’s maximum commitment in any month was to provide up to 
                                                 
68 Optimal Interiors, LLC v. HON Co., 774 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1013 n.18 (S.D. Iowa 2011) 
69 DP Serv., Inc. v. AM Int'l, 508 F. Supp. 162, 167 (N.D. Ill. 1981) 
70 “A stent is a tiny tube placed into a hollow structure in your body. This structure can be an artery, a blood 
vessel, or something such as the tube that carries urine (ureter). The stent holds the structure open… A 
drug-eluting stent is coated with a medicine. This medicine helps further prevent the arteries from re-
closing,” MedlinePlus Medical Encyclopedia. https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/002303.htm. 
71 At 803. The disclaimer did not include a reference to lost profits as a type of consequential damage. 
72 Biotronik, A.G. v. Conor Medsystems Ireland, Ltd., 33 Misc. 3d 1219(A), 939 N.Y.S.2d 739 (Sup. Ct. 
2011); Biotronik A.G. v. Conor Medsystems Ireland, Ltd., 95 A.D.3d 724, 945 N.Y.S.2d 258 (2012), rev'd, 
22 N.Y.3d 799, 11 N.E.3d 676 (2014); Biotronik A.G. v. Conor Medsystems Ireland, Ltd., 22 N.Y.3d 799, 
11 N.E.3d 676 (2014). 
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30% more than the forecast amount; it had the option, but not the obligation, of supplying 
more. Nor did the agreement specify price. Biotronik was free to charge its customers any 
price. An essential aspect of Biotronik’s role was to negotiate with customers for the best 
prices. Unlike in the simple retailer arrangement described above, the wholesale price 
was not fixed, it depended on the prices Biotronik succeeded in obtaining. It would then 
pay to Conor a transfer price of 61% of its net sales.73 At the end of each quarter the 
parties would meet to agree upon a minimum transfer price for the following quarter. The 
transfer price would be determined by dividing the net sales by the quantity of stents sold 
in the period. At the end of the quarter there would be a reconciliation; if the actual 
transfer price exceeded the minimum, Biotronik would pay the difference to Conor; if it 
fell short, then Conor would receive the minimum; it would not have to compensate 
Biotronik for the shortfall.  
The trial judge held that “Biotronik is claiming damages in the form of lost profits 
on collateral business arrangements, and that these are consequential damages.”74 It then 
invoked Comment 6 to UCC 2-715: “In the case of sale of wares to one in the business of 
reselling them, resale is one of the requirements of which the seller has reason to know 
within the meaning of subsection (2)(a).” This, it said, “squarely places a buyer’s lost 
profits from a seller’s breach of an agreement to supply those goods within the realm of 
consequential damages.”75 However, this misinterprets 2-715. It allows for recovery as 
consequential damages, but it does not mean that all such cases must be for consequential 
damages. As White and Summers say: “section 2–715(2) is not an exhaustive 
specification of the necessary and sufficient conditions for application of the concept of 
consequential damages”76 The Appellate Court, invoking CRESPA and the “collateral 
business” argument, affirmed.   
The Court of Appeals majority held that the damages were general. “This 
distinction does not mean that lost resale profits can never be general damages simply 
because they involve a third-party transaction. Such a bright-line rule violates the case 
specific approach we have used to distinguish general damages from consequential . . . . 
The present case illustrates the wisdom of our traditional approach.”77 The profits flowed 
directly from the pricing formula. The purpose of the agreement was to resell and this 
distinguished it from “a situation where the buyer’s resale to a third party is independent 
of the underlying agreement.”78 Rather than having Conor pay Biotronik, the contract 
required that Biotronik pay Conor the minimum transfer price, a distinction emphasized 
by the dissent.79 However, the majority argued, “Whether lost profits are the natural and 
probable result of a breach does not turn on which party actually takes out the checkbook 
                                                 
73 If a subdistributor or affiliate made the sales in the markets that Biotronik did not directly serve, Conor 
would receive 75% of Biotronik’s net sales. 
74 At 13. 
75 At 14. Comment 6. 
76 1 James J. White et al., Uniform Commercial Code § 11:7 at 987 [Practitioner’s 6th ed. 2010].  (check 
cite) 
77 At 532-533. 
78 At 534. 
79 “Notably, under no circumstance do the Agreement’s pricing provisions require Conor (the breaching 
party) to pay any moneys to Biotronik (the non-breaching party); rather, under certain circumstances 
Biotronik (the non-breaching party) must pay additional moneys to Conor (the breaching party) for the 
purchase of the stents.” At 538. 
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at the end of the fiscal quarter.”80 
Biotronik was providing a package of services to Conor, indirectly charging a 
price for these services.  The price was the future stream of payments, If Conor 
wrongfully terminated the agreement81 Biotronik suffered a direct loss—the revenues it 
would have received less the costs saved, which would include the possibility that the 
resources that would have been used to perform this contract could be deployed 
elsewhere.82 The measurement problem, difficult in any event, would have been 
compounded by the fact that there were competing stents that were, arguably, superior to 
Conor’s. Taking all these factors into account, direct damages would have been very 
difficult to determine and, I suspect, would have been substantially less than Biotronik’s 
expert’s $85 million figure.83 But measurement problems should not deflect attention 
from the basic point: the loss was the direct result of the (alleged) breach. 
II. Delay  
In the typical delay case (e.g., Hadley) the buyer’s loss would be consequential 
damages and would be excluded by a standard disclaimer. In this Section I want to 
consider two more complicated cases in which the court did find some delay costs to be 
direct. In the former, Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Technip USA Corp.,84 the court 
rejected most of the claims that the damages were direct, but held one subset to be direct. 
In the latter, DaimlerChrysler Motors Co., LLC v. Manuel,85 the damages were direct, but 
the court’s rationale was faulty. 
Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. (TGP) entered into an agreement with Technip USA 
for the replacement and upgrade of six compressors on one of TGP’s main transmission 
lines, for a “lump sum, fixed amount” of $86,740,000.86 The project was expected to take 
17 months, but ended up taking three years. TGP claimed that Technip’s delay was a 
breach and it sued to recover its increased costs.87 The agreement had a standard 
consequential damages exclusion:”88 An early draft of the contract had included a  
                                                 
80 At 533. 
81 The court remanded on the liability question. 
82 The dissent noted the possibility of substitution: “The record clearly shows there were at least three other 
brands of drug-eluting coronary stents commercially available when Conor breached the Agreement . . . 
But this should not relieve Biotronik . . . of the obligation imposed by that case to show first that a good 
faith but ultimately unavailing effort was made in the marketplace to secure a substitute for the stent.” At 
542. 
83 I have not been able to get access to the expert’s report. 
84 No. 01-06-00535-CV, 2008 WL 3876141, (Tex. App. Aug. 21, 2008). 
85 362 S.W.3d 160 (2012). 
86 There was testimony that the project involved cutting-edge technology and that there had been a number 
of change orders during the project. (Testimony of William Ellison, p. 13) 
87 No. 01-06-00535-CV, 2008 WL 3876141, at *3 (Tex. App. Aug. 21, 2008). 
88 “Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Agreement to the contrary, in no event shall Owner or 
Contractor be liable to each other for any indirect, special, incidental or consequential loss or damage 
including, but not limited to, loss of profits or revenue, loss of opportunity or use incurred by either Party to 
the other, or like items of loss or damage; and each Party hereby releases the other Party therefrom.” At*3. 
The contract also capped Technip’s liability for any claim arising out of or relating to the contract at “50% 
of the Contract Price, regardless of whether the liability arises out of contract, ... or any other legal or 
equitable theory.” At *8. 
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liquidated damages provision (which specified damages for delay), but it was dropped in 
the final draft in exchange for a $1.5 million reduction in the price. At a pre-trial hearing 
the court instructed the parties to put all their evidence on damages to the jury and that it 
would decide subsequently which damages were excluded as a matter of law. The jury 
found that the delay was a breach of the contract and found damages for over $18 
million. Technip argued that all the damages should have been excluded.  
The Court of Appeals broke down the claims into three broad categories, finding 
only one of them to be direct damages and, therefore compensable. The net result was a 
reduction in damages by about 80%. The ostensible ground for the reduction was 
application of the “naturally and necessarily flow directly from the breach” test. TGP 
compared the cost of gas and oil and labor used in the old compressors with what it 
anticipated it would have expended had the new, more efficient compressors been timely 
installed. The claim was rejected on the ground that it fell outside the contract; the costs 
were too remote for Technip to have foreseen or contemplated them, said the court. 
Whether these costs were really unforeseeable is disputable. But that dispute goes to the 
distinction between consequential damages that are recoverable and ones that are not.  
TGP also argued that it should be compensated for interest on the project for the 
delay period. It had financed the project from its own funds, so its interest costs were not 
actual payments, but only imputed interest for the delay period. The court distinguished 
this case from one in which the plaintiff had borrowed funds so that the interest was not 
imputed. There is, however, no good reason to treat the two cases differently. In either 
case the loss (interest o money already paid to Technip) would be consequential. The 
court concluded: “The lost use of money represents an indirect loss to TGP because any 
return that might be attributable to theoretical investments TGP might have made falls 
outside its Contract with Technip.”89  
The Court found one category of claims to be direct damages: the additional 
expenses for labor, travel, and other costs that would not have been incurred but for the 
delay. These costs included payments for such things as environmental contractors and 
administration of the contract. The exclusion, it held,  
[did[ not preclude recovery of direct damages involving loss of use, 
opportunity, or profits . . . because they naturally and necessarily flow 
directly from the breach . . . . The parties clearly contemplated that TGP 
would incur these costs throughout the Project and a breach of the 
Contract by delay naturally and necessarily would cause these costs to be 
extended over a longer period of time. . . . It can be conclusively presumed 
to have been foreseen or contemplated by Technip that, as a consequence 
of its breach of the Contract by delay, TGP would have to continue paying 
these ongoing costs.90  
Were these expenses more foreseeable than the additional costs incurred by using the old 
compressors? Do they flow more naturally from the breach? In either case, TGP incurred 
costs that it would not, had Technip finished on time. The criteria—foreseeability or 
naturalness—are inappropriate. The Court is again distinguishing between consequential 
                                                 
89 At 10. 
90 At p. 8. 
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damages that would be compensable and those that would not be. But since all 
consequential damages were excluded, TGP should have received nothing. In effect, the 
damages were prepaid when the parties traded the liquidated damages for a price cut. 
 The case suggests an interesting paradox. Recall that prior to revision the contract 
included a liquidated damage clause. The liquidated damages would be, as per 2-718(1), 
a reasonable measure of damages “in the light of the anticipated or actual harm.”91 What 
would the anticipated harm have been? Consequential damages.92 Nonetheless, the 
liquidated damages should be viewed as direct. Otherwise, we would end up with the 
absurd result of the consequential damages exclusion negating the liquidated damages 
clause. 
The facts in the second case were unusual. Texas, like many other states, had an 
auto dealer protection statute. One aspect of the law was of particular importance in this 
case. Dealers had the right to protest the establishment or relocation of other dealerships 
selling the same line or make of vehicles in the same county or within fifteen miles of the 
existing dealership. By filing a notice of protest a dealer would trigger an administrative 
proceeding in which the applicant for the new dealership has the burden of establishing 
“good cause.” Until the proceeding is resolved, the new dealership could not proceed and 
the final resolution of protests could take years.  
The plaintiff, Tommy Manuel, had been a franchised auto dealer in the Dallas-
Fort Worth area for 47 years, 25 for Chrysler. Chrysler wanted to reorganize its 
dealership arrangement in the area and it entered into a franchise dealership with Manuel 
in an “Agreement to Enter into Sales and Service Agreement” (the AESSA). Chrysler 
paid Manuel about $15 million (some of which was to settle previous litigation between 
them) to give up his previous franchise; it gave him a new one in a different location. The 
agreement recognized that there was a possibility that another dealer may protest the new 
location. In the event of a protest Chrysler promised to “use its best efforts to litigate or 
settle the protest or lawsuit in order to allow the establishment of the dealership.”93 
Another dealer, Meador, did file a protest against this dealership and the filing triggered a 
statutory stay against Manuel’s attempt to open his dealership. 
Eight months after the protest was filed Chrysler settled with Meador. Manuel 
sued Chrysler for the delay, arguing that Chrysler had not used its best efforts to settle 
Meador’s protest. The trial court found in Manuel’s favor on the liability issue (Chrysler 
did not use its best efforts) and the Court of Appeals upheld that finding. The jury found 
damages of $370,000 for lost profits due to the one-year delay in opening his dealership. 
Manuel’s claim was that he had lost one year’s worth of profits. He argued that the year 
he missed was a particularly good year for selling cars; when he finally opened, the 
market had soured and he suffered losses.94 
                                                 
91 UCC 2-718(1). 
92 The decision does not say, but most likely the liquidated damages would have been for delay, setting a 
price per day. 
93 At 168. 
94 “It was undisputed that the years 2000 and 2001 were exceptionally good years for car sales in the 
Dallas–Fort Worth market, but Manuel was not able to complete and open the South Arlington dealership 
until February 2002. A significant downturn in sales and a steep decline of the American market share of 
automobiles began in 2002. They were continuing at the time of trial, and the new dealership sustained a 
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The damage issue was complicated by the fact that there were two linked 
agreements and their language was inconsistent. The AESSA limited liability to “out-of-
pocket expenses that cannot be mitigated.”95 In the Settlement Agreement the dealer 
waived consequential damages but said that both parties would be liable for actual 
damages.96 In the event that terms conflicted, the Settlement Agreement terms would 
control.97 The best efforts promise appeared only in the AESSA, adding an additional 
complication. The Court concluded that the Settlement Agreement governed. Manuel 
clearly could not recover consequential damages. But the court was then left with the 
question: what were “actual damages” and were they recoverable? Actual damages, it 
concluded, would include both direct and consequential damages. 
The Court relied on Cherokee County in reaching the conclusion that lost profits 
could be direct losses, not consequential damages. Chrysler argued that the damage claim 
was for lost income from collateral contracts (retail sales the dealership would have made 
to third parties). The Court emphatically rejected that: “The recent Cherokee County case 
supports recovery of lost profits for resale to third parties as direct damages in the face of 
a limitation-of-damages clause, similar to the one in this case, which waived recovery of 
consequential damages without mentioning lost profits. . . . It bears repeating that lost 
profits are not per se consequential damages solely because there will be a subsequent 
sale to third parties.”98 But, as shown above, in Cherokee County the direct damages were 
simply the contract-market differential; resale was (or, at least, should have been) 
irrelevant.  
Nonetheless, Manuel did suffer direct damages. Like Biotronik, he was selling 
retailing services to a manufacturer. Unlike Biotronik, he was not terminated, he only lost 
sales for the period of delay.  His payment for that period would have been the difference 
between the wholesale and retail price. The damages would have been determined by 
subtracting the costs avoided, just as in NIPSCO or Biotronik. There could be a dispute 
over whether the damages should be based on his actual performance (the losses he 
                                                                                                                                                 
loss for 2002 and subsequent years.” (At 169) 
95 “In the event of a default under this Agreement, the sole liability of the defaulting party is payment of the 
other parties’ out-of-pocket expenses that cannot be mitigated. Both You and DCMC waive any rights to 
other compensatory damages or to consequential or punitive damages under any theory of law or cause of 
action, including any applicable motor vehicle dealer-manufacturer statute. Both You and DCMC waive 
any right to trial by jury in any litigation to enforce the terms of this Agreement.” (Manuel Brief, p. 28) 
96 “Manuel and his subsidiary dealership corporations, including MCDI and West Loop, and DCMC, waive 
any claims they may have for incidental or consequential damages, for punitive or exemplary damages, and 
for jury trial, that may arise by virtue of any breach of this Agreement or the AESSA, or by virtue of any 
transaction based in whole or in part upon a provision of this Agreement or the AESSA. The parties remain 
liable for any actual damages. (Manuel Brief, p. 28) 
97 “This Agreement is not a part of the Sales and Service Agreement of any dealership. The terms of any 
Sales and Service Agreement prevail if there is any conflict. To the extent that there is any conflict between 
this Agreement and any other agreement or document other than a Sales and Service Agreement between 
DCMC and a dealership owned or controlled by Manuel . . . the terms of this Agreement prevail.” (Manuel 
Brief, p. 29) 
98 At 185, citing Cherokee County). For some reason the Court claimed that the Cherokee County court had 
held that the contract was not for the sale of goods, controlled by the UCC, but was decided on common 
law grounds. (At 184) This was obviously false. 
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actually suffered) or performance in the boom year that he missed. But the answer to that 
does not affect the conclusion that the damages were direct. 
III. Breach of Warranty 
When a seller breaches a warranty the buyer can suffer a number of different 
types of losses. Some, but not all, would clearly fall in the consequential damages 
category, for example delay and lost profits arising because of the failure. Others would 
clearly not be. If, for example, a seller promised a product that produced 100 units and 
delivered one that only produced 80, the damages would be based on the difference.99 
Whether that would be the difference in value or the cost of achieving the promised 
amount is a difficult question, but that has nothing to do with the fact that these would not 
be consequential damages. If the promisee incurred (wasted) expenses before it learned 
that the goods were not as warranted, the damages would be neither direct nor 
consequential—they would be for reliance. They might not be compensable, but that 
would not be because of the exclusion clause.      
 In American Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.100 AEP sued 
Westinghouse for breach of warranty.101 Westinghouse sold a turbine generator for about 
$12 million (over $60 million in current prices). The generator was not an off-the-shelf 
product; the technology was evolving. The trial judge characterized the turbine as “a 
highly complex, sophisticated, and in some ways experimental piece of equipment,”102 
and noted “that Westinghouse engineers are engaged in a continuous process of research 
and development in order to update and improve the design and functioning of their 
turbine-generators.”103 The unit was guaranteed to produce 760,000 kilowatts. 
Westinghouse manufactured and installed the generator over a period of about two years. 
After installation there were two separate failures; repairing each entailed a five-month 
delay. In addition, AEP claimed (and for summary judgment purposes the court took to 
be true) that the generator was only capable of producing 690,000 kilowatts.  
 The agreement included a number of restrictions on AEP’s potential recovery. 
Westinghouse promised that if there were defects its responsibility would be limited to 
repair and replacement; it disclaimed liability for consequential damages and capped its 
total liability at the price of the defective equipment: 
The Seller warrants that the equipment to be delivered will be of the kind 
and quality described in this contract and will be free of defects in 
workmanship and material. Should any failure to conform to this warranty 
appear within one year after the initial date of synchronization, the Seller 
shall, upon notification thereof and substantiation that the equipment has 
been stored, installed, maintained and operated in accordance with the 
company’s recommendations and standard industry practice, correct such 
                                                 
99 “The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and place of acceptance 
between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted.” 
(UCC 2-714(2) 
100 418 F.Supp. 435 (1976). 
101 It added complaints of fraudulent inducement and misrepresentation, which I will ignore. Westinghouse 
counterclaimed for the last installment payment of about $1.4 million. 
102 At 458. 
103 At 452. 
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defects including non-conformance with the specification, by suitable 
repair or replacement at its own expense.104 
Correction of non-conformities, in the manner and for the period of time 
provided above, shall constitute fulfillment of all liabilities of the 
Company to the purchaser, whether based on contract, negligence or 
otherwise with respect to, or arising out of such equipment.105 
Except as otherwise agreed herein, the Seller shall not be liable for special, 
or consequential damages, such as, but not limited to, damage or loss of 
other property or equipment, loss of profits or revenue, loss of use of 
power system, cost of capital, cost of purchased or replacement power, or 
claims of customers of purchaser for service interruptions. The remedies 
of the purchaser set forth herein are exclusive, and the liability of Seller 
with respect to any contract, or anything done in connection therewith 
such as the performance or breach thereof, or from the manufacture, sale, 
delivery, resale, installation or technical direction of installation, repair or 
use of any equipment covered by or furnished under this contract whether 
in contract, in tort, under any warranty, or otherwise, shall not, except as 
expressly provided herein, exceed the price of the equipment of (or) part 
on which such liability is based.106 
AEP sought damages for costs of replacement electricity, increased costs of 
operating less efficient units, increased fuel costs, lost profits, and loss of return on their 
capital investment. It argued that in reliance on Westinghouse’s representations regarding 
the generator it constructed ancillary plant equipment at a cost of over $100 million.107 
These delay damages were clearly covered by the disclaimer.  
But what of the failure to repair and replace? Since the generator was installed at 
AEP’s plant and it had accepted delivery, it could not invoke perfect tender. If, indeed, it 
had received less than it had bargained for, its damages were direct and would not be 
covered by the disclaimer. (Westinghouse argued that it had fully complied and therefore 
damages on this issue should be zero.108) It is less clear how the damages should be 
measured. Should the remedy be the difference between a 760,000 kw generator and a 
690,000 kw generator? If so, would it be based on the difference in capacity (roughly ten 
per cent), the difference in costs of new generators with those capacities, or the cost of 
bringing the generator up to the contract specifications? The contract does not say. Nor 
does it deal with the possibility of rapid technological change which could mean that the 
generator, even if it had met the specifications, would now be obsolete. It only treats 
these questions indirectly by capping liability at the price of the equipment 
AEP argued that “Westinghouse has acted in bad faith in repairing the Unit, has 
been willfully dilatory in rendering repairs, and has not merely failed to repair or replace 
but has repudiated its obligation to repair and replace. As such, plaintiffs argue, the 
                                                 
104 At 440. 
105 At 440. 
106 At 440-441. 
107 At 460 (fn 44). 
108That was a fact question that could not be resolved on summary judgment. 
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limited and exclusive remedy of repair or replacement provided for in the contract has 
failed of its essential purpose.”109 Citing UCC 2-719(2), AEP claimed that because the 
remedy had failed in its essential purpose, the limitation was voided.110 While the court 
cited a number of cases in which the “failure of essential purpose” allowed a plaintiff to 
avoid the consequential damages disclaimer, it chose not to do so. The repair & replace 
provision was independent of the consequential damages remedy and since the court 
found that the disclaimer was not unconscionable, it was given effect.111 The court 
concluded: 
In the event that this court finds that the defendant has totally failed to 
perform its warranty to repair or replace, damages at least in an amount 
equal to the price of all uncorrected parts will be recoverable. Thus, if the 
generator, as a unit, cannot or has not been repaired so as to meet contract 
specifications, and has not been replaced by a generator that can, the full 
purchase price of the generator may be recovered as damages by the 
plaintiff. Moreover, if plaintiffs’ direct damages exceed this amount they 
may be recoverable as well, since the contract precludes the recovery of 
consequential damages only.112 
The court did not explain why the direct damages could exceed the replacement 
cost, nor why such additional compensation should be recoverable. The cap would seem 
to limit recovery to the cost of the replacement generator. Nor did the court determine 
which claims would be for direct damages, leaving that to be determined at trial. It is not 
clear how the damages should be measured. Should the remedy be the difference between 
a 760,000 kw generator and a 690,000 kw generator? If so, would it be based on the 
difference in capacity (roughly ten per cent), the difference in costs of new generators 
with those capacities, or the cost of bringing the generator up to the contract 
specifications? The contract does not say. The UCC suggests that it be based on the 
difference in value: “The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at 
the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value 
they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show 
proximate damages of a different amount.”113 
Consequential damage exclusions sometimes appear in corporate acquisitions. A 
study of private target acquisitions completed in 2014 found that they were included in 
about half.114 In one such deal, Pharmaceutical Product Development, Inc. (PPD) 
                                                 
109 At 453. 
110At 456. UCC 2-719(2): “where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential 
purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act.” 
111 The court added one  caveat regarding fraud: “the contractual limitation of liability precluding the 
recovery of consequential damages cannot be effective if plaintiffs’ claims of fraudulent inducement are 
sustained at trial. The defendant cannot be heard to rely on the provisions of a contract which was entered 
into as a result of fraudulent actions on defendant’s part.” At 460. 
112 At 459. 
113 UCC 2-714(2). Comment 3 qualifies this: It is “the usual, standard, and reasonable method of 
ascertaining damages in the case of breach of warranty but it is not intended as an exclusive measure.” 
114 Private Target M&A Deal Points Study, slide 74.  If acquirers are substantially larger than the sellers, 
the agreement would be less likely to include a consequential damages exclusion. Impact of “Buyer Power 
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purchased Magen Biosciences for $14.866 million.115 Magen had a product (MAG-131), 
a Vitamin D Receptor Modulator (VDRM) that was intended to treat psoriasis. Magen 
represented that the product was 60-130 fold more potent than the currently FDA-
approved VDRM. In fact, it was barely, if at all, more potent. The merger agreement 
provided that the sellers were liable for losses resulting from “any breach or inaccuracy 
of a representation or warranty of the Company contained in [the Merger Agreement].”116 
PPD sued, asserting that Magen had breached a representation that “The Company 
[Magen] has provided to PPD all information and data known to the Company relating to 
safety, efficacy, and toxicity of all Company Products.”117  
Magen attempted to have the claim dismissed, arguing that it had not breached 
because the drug met the efficacy standard; potency, it claimed, was irrelevant. Vice 
Chancellor Strine rejected this argument, although he did hold out the possibility that 
efficacy could be ambiguous and that it could be a question of fact. Magen also objected 
to some components of the damage claim. It did not object to PPD’s claim for a return of 
the purchase price. It did, however, object to two other claims. 
PPD argued that after the purchase it made additional fruitless expenditures for 
R&D on MAG-31 (($7.4 million) and that, once it became clear that it had bought a 
worthless company it incurred costs in shutting down the project ($2 million). The issue 
was whether these costs were consequential damages that were excluded by the contract. 
Section 7.4(c) of the Merger Agreement (“Limits on Indemnification”) stated: 
In no event shall the indemnification obligations under this article vii or 
the term “losses” cover or include (x) consequential, incidental, special, 
indirect, or punitive damages, unless such damages are actually paid to a 
third party claimant by an indemnified party, whether based on statute, 
contract, tort or otherwise, and whether or not arising from the 
indemnifying party’s sole, joint or concurrent negligence, strict liability or 
tort, or (y) lost profits.118  
This is one of the few cases in which the contract treated lost profits damages as 
being independent of consequential damages.119 Citing earlier case law and Black’s Law 
Dictionary, Magen argued that special damages were natural, “but not the necessary 
result of the act complained of . . . . [They] do not flow directly and immediately from an 
injurious act, but that result indirectly from the act.”120 
The alleged losses resulting from PPD’s research and development costs 
or its expenses relating to winding down PPD Dermatology, even if 
purportedly foreseeable at the time of the alleged breach, are thus not 
recoverable from Stockholder Defendants under the Merger Agreement. 
Costs associated with winding down PPD Dermatology are merely 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ratio” on Selected M&A Deal Terms in Acquisitions of Privately Held Target Companies by Publicly 
Traded Buyers, ABA Mergers & Acquisitions Committee (July 2017)  
115 Pharmaceutical Product Development, Inc. v. TVM Life Science Ventures VI 2011 WL 549163 (2011) 
116 At 1. 
117 At 1. 
118 Opening Brief in Support of Stockholder Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, 6. 
119 See the next Section.  
120 Defendant Brief, p. 12. 
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incidental to the rescission sought by PPD and PPD’s expenditures on 
research and development of MAG-131 prior to discovering the alleged 
breach are not the “necessary result” of Magen’s alleged 
misrepresentations but rather a consequence of PPD’s own actions. 
Accordingly, PPD is explicitly prohibited from recovering such losses 
from the Stockholder Defendants in their capacity as indemnitors.121 
PPD responded by arguing that direct damages are those that arise naturally and 
ordinarily while consequential damages “arise from the intervention of special 
circumstances.”122 The expenses before it discovered the breach for employee salaries, 
toxicology studies, etc. were  
characteristic of the investment that would occur after the purchase of any 
biotechnology company developing pre-clinical compounds. In other 
words, PPD’s routine investment in the further development of MAG-131 
was not due to a unique circumstance attributable to PPD. Similarly, 
PPD’s expenses in winding down PPD Dermatology were costs that would 
naturally be incurred by any party that acquired a company that lacked any 
viable products. Thus, these losses are direct damages, not indirect or 
consequential ones, and are therefore recoverable under Section 7.4(a).123 
PPD also argued that if the seller had knowledge of the falsity of the representation at the 
time of the breach (had committed fraud), then the exclusion should be unenforceable as 
a matter of public policy.124 
 Vice Chancellor Strine accepted, at the motion dismiss stage, the possibility that 
PPD could show that the damages were direct and therefore recoverable: 
 
I am chary to make the context-specific determination about the Drug 
Development Costs given the necessarily limited record. For one thing, it 
is not at all obvious, especially at the pleadings stage, that the $7.4 million 
spent on further researching and developing MAG–131 is unique to PPD 
in the sense that it seems reasonable to infer that any acquiring drug 
company in PPD’s position would want, and most likely need, to continue 
investing resources in the research and development of the acquired 
experimental compounds that were the reason the acquirer purchased the 
company. The situation with respect to the $2 million allegedly spent in 
winding up PPD Dermatology, Inc. is similar in that it seems plausible that 
a close down of PPD, Dermatology, Inc. was the only logical step 
available to PPD, who claims to have been defrauded into buying what 
turned out to be a worthless company and that such shut-down costs would 
be a component of a full rescissory damages award. In sum, on a motion to 
dismiss, I am not able to make the determination that the Magen 
Stockholders’ urge—that the Drug Development Costs are indisputably 
                                                 
121 Defendant’s Brief, pp. 12-13 
122 Plaintiff Brief, at 25, citing Restatement Second of contracts, 351 comment b. 
123  Plaintiff Brief, at 25. 
124 They drew upon an earlier opinion by Vice Chancellor Strine, ABRY Partners. PPD had not yet found 
evidence of fraud, but argued that it might show up in the course of discovery. 
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special damages.125 
PPD’s claim is analogous to a repair and replace claim in a contract for goods. If 
the expenditures had succeeded in restoring MAG 31’s efficacy/potency (and if the court 
found the expenditures reasonable) the costs would no doubt have been compensable. But 
it failed. If the court were to conclude that the effort had been in good faith, I believe that 
it ought to have found in favor of PPD. By analogy, had AEP insisted on removal of the 
flawed generators, Westinghouse would have borne the cost of removal. 
IV. Lost Profits Exclusions 
Lost profits typically appear in limitation clauses in the laundry list of 
consequential damages. Lost profits that were not a form of consequential damages 
would normally be recoverable, despite the limitation clauses. There is good reason for 
that since the purest version of direct damages, the contract/market differential, is often 
referred to as lost profits. Nevertheless, there are some exceptions. The PPD-Magen 
contract, discussed above, was one of the few exceptions. In a second, Progress Energy, 
Inc. v. U.S. Global, LLC,126 also a corporate acquisition, the clause clearly treated lost 
profits as a separate category: “In no event shall any party be liable to any other party 
under any provision of this Agreement for any lost profits, lost sales, business 
interruption, lost business opportunities, lost Tax Credits, lost Tonnage Fees or 
consequential, incidental, punitive or exemplary damages incurred or suffered by a 
party.”127 The trial court and the dissent both claimed that only consequential damages 
were barred, but benefit-of-the-bargain claims were not. However, the majority found the 
language unambiguous and remanded to determine whether the claimant’s sole remedy, 
specific performance, would be available. 
In Imaging Systems Intern., Inc. v. Magnetic Resonance Plus, Inc.,128 the court 
upheld a limitation on liability for lost profits. The clause was unambiguous: “Limitation 
of liability [:] neither the customer nor MRP will be liable to each other or any other 
party for any lost profits or any incidental, special, or consequential damages relating to 
this agreement.”129 The plaintiff tried to argue that the clause only related to 
consequential damages, but the court properly held otherwise: 
Thus there are two types of lost profits: (1) lost profits which are direct 
damages and represent the benefit of the bargain (such as a general 
contractor suing for the remainder of the contract price less his saved 
expenses), and (2) lost profits which are indirect or consequential damages 
such as what the user of the MRI would lose if the machine were not 
working and he was unable to perform diagnostic services for several 
patients. The contract at issue did not distinguish between the two types; it 
forbade the recovery of “ANY LOST PROFITS.” No exceptions were 
provided for. The meaning of “any” in context is “all.” Both consequential 
                                                 
125 At 7. 
126 102 So.3d 768 (2012). 
127 At 769. 
128 227 Ga.App. 641 (1997 
129 At 642. 
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damages and direct damages (to the extent direct damages concern lost 
profits) are not recoverable under the contract.130 
In SOLIDFX, LLC v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc.,131 the court interpreted the liability 
limitation clause to exclude lost profits separately. There the language was ambiguous, at 
best. 
8.2 exclusion of consequential and other damages: except to the extent of 
the indemnification obligations set forth in section 9, neither party will 
have any obligation or liability whatsoever, whether arising in contract 
(including warranty), tort (whether or not arising from the negligence of 
either party), strict liability or otherwise, 
8.2.1 for loss of use, revenue or profit; or 
8.2.2 for any other indirect, incidental, consequential, special, exemplary, 
punitive, or other damages with respect to the Jeppesen data, the Jit, and 
other products and services provided hereunder;132 
The court interpreted the lost profits of 8.2.1 as being independent of the 
consequential damages of 8.2.2. The italicized phrase—any other—should, I think, be 
interpreted to mean that lost profits was a subcategory of the damages listed in 8.2.2. 
Ultimately, it did not matter since the court concluded that the claimed damages were 
consequential so that 8.2.1 did not apply. 
For another case close to the boundary (but I think this time on the other side), 
consider In re CCT Communications, Inc.133 The language seemed pretty clear: “In no 
circumstances shall either we or you be liable for indirect, consequential, reliance, or 
special loss or damages or for lost revenues, lost savings, lost business opportunity or lost 
profits of any kind.”134 The defendant’s interpretation was straightforward: “by 
separating the second part of the clause from the first with the conjunction ‘or,’ and by 
including in it the words ‘of any kind,’ the parties meant to bar claims for both direct and 
consequential lost revenues, lost savings, lost business opportunity, and lost profits. 
Specifically, the ‘or’ is disjunctive, and the various ‘lost’ categories following it stand in 
contrast to the ‘broad’ categories of damages in the first clause.”135 Nonetheless, the court 
found the language sufficiently ambiguous to postpone its decision: “I decline to interpret 
the full scope of § 6.2 as a matter of law, except to the extent that I conclude, as both 
sides agree, that it bars claims for consequential, indirect or special damages. . . . I 
expressly decline to conclude as a matter of law that § 6.2 bars general or direct damage 
claims, but recognize the possibility that extrinsic evidence, including trade usage, may 
explain its meaning.”136 The rationale was that “lost revenues, lost savings, lost business 
opportunity or lost profits of any kind” could have left some wiggle room—there might 
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be some category of general or direct damages that was not included. The court at least 
left open the possibility that the contract/market differential was not included in the 
laundry list. Had the court accepted the defendant’s interpretation, there could have been 
no recovery for the contract/market differential. That surely is a plausible interpretation 
of the language.137 
The plaintiff did not need the wiggle room. The contract explicitly priced 
termination by Global Crossing: 
If Global Crossing terminated the RCA based on a CCT breach, CCT was 
required to pay Global Crossing 100% of the Monthly Recurring Charges 
(“MRC”) remaining for the service term in addition to charges, if any, 
relating to the early termination of any local access circuits. . . . The 
parties agreed that the termination fees provided for in § 5 of the RCA 
“are based on agreed revenue expectation and are not a penalty.” . . . The 
MRC was $71 per concurrent call session, . . . and CCT “purchased” 1,344 
concurrent call sessions for a period of three years ending in December 
2009. Hence, if CCT breached the parties’ contract and Global Crossing 
terminated it, CCT still had to pay $95,424 per month until December 
2009. This amount reflected direct damages—the lost revenues under the 
parties’ contract.138 
In effect, the contract could be interpreted as saying  that Global Crossing waived the 
right to collect any damages in addition to the liquidated damages defined in the contract. 
V. Concluding Remarks 
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means 
just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.” “The question is,” said Alice, 
“whether you can make words mean so many different things.” “The question is,” said 
Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—that’s all.”139 
Humpty would, no doubt, have appreciated the definitional flexibility courts have 
given to “general damages.” They could be a component of consequential damages, and 
therefore excluded under a clause limiting recovery of consequential damages. Or they 
could be direct damages and recoverable. The criterion in either case would be the 
naturalness or foreseeability of the result. The courts, like Humpty, have been free to 
choose. 
I have argued that concepts like foreseeability, naturalness and collateral business 
have not been useful in determining whether a particular claim could be excluded under a 
consequential damages limitation. The outer edges of consequential damages might be 
blurry, but I believe that I have somewhat sharpened the definition. I have approached the 
problem by analyzing three different categories of claims. First, if the claim arose from a 
wrongful termination, the loss of value of the claimant’s contract—the lost profits—
                                                 
137 The inordinate number of “or’s” in the clause suggest that this might only be a case of bad grammar. 
138 At 120. 
139 LEWIS CARROLL (Charles L. Dodgson), Through the Looking-Glass, chapter 6, p. 205 (1934). First 
published in 1872. 
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would be direct damages. Properly calculated that would reflect the claimant’s reasonable 
mitigation; in the simplest version it is just the contract/market differential. The more 
controversial version of this argument concerns contracts in which the claimant would 
not be paid directly for its services—distribution contracts in which the distributor’s 
compensation is a function of the sales.  
Second, I argued that in most instances losses arising out of a delay (like Hadley) 
should be treated as consequential damages. Courts have generally been consistent about 
this; I discussed two, instances in which courts concluded otherwise. In the first, I 
suggested that the costs should have been treated as consequential; in the latter, I 
reinterpreted the contract as the manufacturer buying distribution services; the court, I 
suggested got the right result but for the wrong reason. Finally, if the complaint concerns 
the breach of a warranty, the direct damages would not be future lost profits; rather they 
would be the costs of providing the claimant with what it had been promised. That could 
entail the costs of achieving what had been warranted. Whether the costs would be borne 
by the breacher (AEP v. Westinghouse) or the non-breacher (PPD v TVM) should not 
matter; in both cases the damages would be direct.  
